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
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
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


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
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**MOBILIZATION AND DEFENSE MANAGEMENT
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**LONG WAR VERSUS SHORT WAR: AN
APPRaisal OF POLICY**



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THE INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

MOBILIZATION STUDIES PROGRAM REPORT

LONG WAR VERSUS SHORT WAR: AN APPRAISAL OF POLICY

by

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Royce W. Reiss, Jr.

A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
IN
FULFILLMENT OF THE RESEARCH REQUIREMENT

Research Supervisor: COL Frederick Hull, USA

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May 1983



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Bahr, David E. Ensch, John C., CDR, USN Milam, Michael M. LTC, USA Reiss, Royce, H., Jr.	Long War Versus Short War: An Appraisal of Policy. This Report Title Changed from Long War/Short War: A Spectral Approach To Preparedness Planning (ASAPP)
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT <i>Unclassified</i>	REPORT NUMBER <i>M MSP #24</i>
ABSTRACT	
<p><u>Problem Statement:</u> This study examines the common and unique factors, implications and considerations associated with long war and short war and investigates a spectral approach to Defense Preparedness Planning. The subject is looked at from (1) the historical context of past preparedness planning; (2) the current situation in preparedness planning; (3) and a spectral approach alternative to present preparedness planning.</p>	
<p><u>Recommendations:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. The Armed Forces support current SECDEF initiatives by action as well as spirit.2. DOD submit military requirements in specific terms of tons of steel, titanium, etc., as the basis for industrial planning.3. The Service Chiefs identify their specific needs for sustainment by the industrial base and fund the related programs.4. Improve the Army Individual Ready Reserve.5. Department of Defense develop the force structure necessary to support our military requirements without regard to arbitrary or predetermined budget ceilings and procure that force at the lowest possible cost.6. Hold Congressional hearings relative to the national planning for industrial mobilization.7. Department of Defense, Department of Commerce and U.S. Industry jointly review the specific improvements to the National Stockpile.8. Withhold early U.S. commitment to the Nuclear Arms Limitation Talks long enough for the United States to gain a deterrent edge, not solely in the nuclear deterrent context.9. Adjust strategy and doctrine so that optimal use is made of equipment currently in R&D and projected for fielding in 1990.	
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10. Develop a strategy for incremental industrial mobilization in response to ambiguous warning.

11. Prioritize funding far sea and air mobility assets and C3I ahead of longer range technology programs.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The contemporary understanding of Long War and Short War involves factors, implications and considerations which are not commonly accepted. The Long War versus Short War debate does not possess the legitimacy of either policy or strategy. It does however impact on national strategy and the subsequent allocation of resources through the budget process. The underlying ideas and resulting opinions are so prevalent that it is necessary to put the debate into perspective so as not to endanger the efficiency of current policies and strategies. Ironically the various doctrinal and force structure modifications which are founded on the debate are themselves shortsighted. Without fully understanding the historic pitfalls of "Short War" planning and "Long War" objectives we are reduced to couching the solutions in terms of technology rather than eliminating the problems which underlie inadequate planning processes.

Historically it was fashionable to plan for conflicts of short duration. Although based initially on technology and doctrine both World Wars had a different outcome for reasons of sustainability and national determination. Assuredly the pre-World War planners in Europe anticipated the need to sustain the offensive, but in all cases it was anticipated that a quick victory was inevitable because of the extensive nature of their planning. There were other reasons for planning for a short war--economics and national support. This is not to say that the citizenry was consulted in the planning phase, but the planners believed that the public, when adequately prepared psychologically would be willing to sacrifice for a limited period

believing that they would prevail. At no time was the long duration of the conflict itself a question. However, the resultant period of prosperity and national determinism was discussed in terms of long duration. On the one hand we must not repeat the mistakes of the past, on the other, however, we must understand that the reasons for those mistakes may be in a different context today (pp 6 to 18).

Current Defense Guidance states that in order to avoid being presented with an unacceptable fait accompli the United States must possess the ability to project forces rapidly and to sustain them long enough to close the "D-P Day Gap". The United States is committed to engage in such conflict as is necessary to protect the vital national interests. It is important that the United States utilize all necessary resources to support national defense requirements for Force Modernization, Readiness, Sustainability and the additional Force Structure. Current Defense and Industrial Preparedness cannot adequately sustain a conflict, be it long, short, conventional or nuclear. Inability to accurately predict either the duration or intensity of a future conflict gives rise to serious concern over our capability to mobilize, train, deploy and sustain the force. Emphasis on DOD Preparedness Planning has historically fluctuated as a function of the perceived threat; the national capacity to mobilize; the current status of allies and nonaligned countries; contemporary economics, the tendency of national will, and the preparedness of our force structure. In order to appreciate the contemporary implications of all these considerations it is first necessary to characterize the Long War and Short War; identify the viability of current policy;

address the nuclear warfare factor, and lastly understand the urgency of the problems we face in sustaining conventional warfare (pp 32 to 39).

There are several fallacies which must be addressed prior to suggesting a modification to the current budget process. These include: equating short warning with short war; assuming that any war in Europe will be a short war; basing our contemporary planning on the experiences of the Arab-Israeli wars, and lastly believing that industrial mobilization is irrelevant in short war planning (pp 42 to 45).

Warning and mobilization are interrelated--the success of the latter being dependent on the effectiveness of the former (pp 46 to 48).

The current dialectic approach forces the decisionmaker to view Long War/Short War in an "either/or" context. If decisionmakers were to adopt a Spectral Approach to Preparedness Planning it is possible to ultimately guarantee Long War requirements while having already satisfied the needs of Short War at a point earlier on the continuum (pp 48 to 50).

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- The Armed Forces support current SECDEF initiatives by action as well as spirit.
- DOD submit military requirements in specific terms of tons of steel, titanium, etc., as the basis for industrial planning.
- The Service Chiefs identify their specific needs for sustainment by the industrial base and fund the related programs.
- Improve the Army Individual Ready Reserve.

- Department of Defense develop the force structure necessary to support our military requirements without regard to arbitrary or predetermined budget ceilings and procure that force at the lowest possible cost.

- Hold Congressional hearings relative to the national planning for industrial mobilization.

- Department of Defense, Department of Commerce and U.S. Industry jointly review the specific improvements to the National Stockpile.

- Withhold early U.S. commitment to the Nuclear Arms Limitation Talks long enough for the United States to gain a deterrent edge, not solely in the nuclear deterrent context.

- Adjust strategy and doctrine so that optimal use is made of equipment currently in R&D and projected for fielding in 1990.

- Develop a strategy for incremental industrial mobilization in response to ambiguous warning.

- Prioritize funding for sea and air mobility assets and C3I ahead of longer range technology programs.

CHAPTER I
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE DEBATE

Introduction

The ongoing debate over the military strategy of the United States and its allies has spilled out of the military journals and onto the front pages of newspapers. What has brought this issue to the attention of much of the world's population is the adoption by the current United States Administration of a new military strategy that calls for a vast arms buildup.¹ This increase in defense spending is driven in part by the requirement in the 1981 Defense Guidance to be prepared for a global conflict of indefinite duration. This is an explicit rejection of the short war idea which characterized the Defense Guidance during the period 1975 to 1980.²

This study examines the common and unique factors, implications and considerations associated with the long war and short war debates, both in the historical context and as currently debated.

Long and Short War Characterization

Because of the lack of general agreement and understanding of long war or short war it is necessary to define these before continuing further. The following are generic descriptions to assist in the evaluation of the debate in both its current and historical context.

A short war is based on preparation for either a single short war or a series of short campaigns/wars which require no significant increase in the degree of commitment of the economy to war production than already exists.

This can include an economy in which the level of war preparation is high but not one in which war priorities prevail over all others.³ Combat consumption and losses will be replaced from war reserve stocks* and current levels of production.

A long war strategy places a greater emphasis on sustainability** of the combat forces and relies on post D-Day production to sustain combat operations (normally achieved by shifting significant amounts of 'civilian' production over to 'war' production). The intent of long war planning is to maximize all necessary or available production in order to outproduce the enemy. This includes a total priority for 'war' production over every aspect of 'civilian' production.⁶

*War Reserve Stocks: "The additional inventories, above the levels needed to support peacetime operations, that we buy to support higher anticipated wartime activity levels and loss rates."⁴

**Sustainability: "The staying power of our combat forces. It depends on the continuing availability of weapons, fuel, supplies, etc., consumed or destroyed during combat operations. It is achieved primarily through a combination of war reserve inventories and post D-Day production. It implies a willingness and determination to fight long enough to win."⁵

Mobilization

A final topic to be addressed and defined is that of mobilization. Mobilization is the act of preparing for war or other emergency by assembling and organizing national resources.⁷ Since the resources available are relatively fixed at any given point in time, the demands of a mobilization imply the movement of resources, allocating them among competing uses, and creation of additional resources. Mobilization can be broken down into several categories. Two mobilization categories are discussed in this paper: Military Mobilization and Industrial Mobilization.

Military Mobilization is the process of bringing the units of the Armed Forces to full wartime authorized strength and providing the material needed for their support. There are three levels of military mobilization: Partial, full, and total mobilization. Full mobilization is the expansion of all of the units, active and reserve, of the Armed Force to wartime strength. Partial mobilization is short of full mobilization in that only a part of the force structure is brought to wartime strength. Total mobilization goes beyond full mobilization in that it also includes the generation of additional units for expansion of the force structure.

Industrial Mobilization is the process of marshalling the manufacturing sector to produce the goods and services required to support both military operations and the civil sector. Industrial mobilization involves producing

more goods, either temporarily by means of a surge,* or permanently by means of expanded capacity. It involves also the allocation of raw materials, labor, and plant capacity on the rational basis among competing uses. Industrial mobilization also includes the requirement that adequate supplies of raw materials be available when needed.⁹

*Surge: The expansion of military production in a peacetime mode without declaration of a national emergency. It is usually used in the context of a rapid increase in production of key warfighting items in response to an emergency short of a declared war. All of the constraints of doing business in peacetime are limiting factors in a surge of defense production.¹⁰

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I (Pages 1-4)

¹Eric J. Lerner, "Major Power Strategies," IEEE Spectrum October 1982, p. 66.

²"DOD Task Force to Improve Industrial Responsiveness," Summary Report, March 1982, p. 2.

³Alan S. Milward, War, Economy, and Society, University of California Press, 1977, pp. 24-26.

⁴Bruce E. Maxon, "Organizing Navy Industrial Preparedness for a Long War," Mobilization Research Paper, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1982, p. 3.

⁵Roderick L. Vawter, "Industrial Mobilization, an Historical Analysis," Mobilization Research Paper, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, June 1981, p. 3.

⁶Milward, pp. 39-42.

⁷Maxon, p. 3.

⁸JCS Pub. 1, 1 June 1979, pp. 147, 222, 254, 353.

⁹John R. Brinkerhoff, "A Conceptual Framework for Emergency Mobilization Preparedness," Phalanx, February 1983, p. 11.

¹⁰Maxon p. 6.

CHAPTER II

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

AN OBJECT LESSON

"What is the use of talking about the past when you are dealing with an altogether new set of considerations?"¹ This poignant question was the focus of a thesis postulated by I.S. Block in his 1897 work entitled, "The War of the Future in Its Technical, Economic and Political Relations." Block was a Polish banker and pacifist of unusual orientation. His goal was not to eliminate war, but rather to show the impact on warfighting of the significant technological changes and improvements which were occurring during the latter part of the 19th century. These changes, he argued, would be so profound as to negate war as a profitable political instrument.² Many of the conclusions, although found lacking from a factual standpoint, proved to be uncannily accurate. His concept of the inter-relationships of the elements of war and the impact of international economic affordability and infrastructure in the context of a "long war - short war argument" will be touched upon later in this chapter.

The issue of the moment, however, is whether change really negates the value of history; or, in spite of the changing nature of war, can contemporary policy makers and strategic planners draw upon historical lessons when developing national security strategy?

To paraphrase an often misquoted statement, "those who cannot learn from history are condemned to repeat it." History is replete with examples of

military analysts and strategists ignoring the value of history when the "long war - short war" debate has arisen. For many reasons (mostly subjective and qualitative), military planners in this century have assumed, a priori, a short war hypothesis and ignored any potential for prolonged war. Failure to fully assess the increasing role of the defensive aspect of war and its logical impact on the duration of a conflict has resulted in global disaster for the belligerents. Pre-WWI German planning drew heavily from earlier examples of successful "short war" strategies. The brevity of both the Austra-Prussian War (1866) and the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871) inspired then Field Marshall von Moltke to use these conflicts as the "boiler plate" for his strategic planning. The Prussians had been victorious over the Austrians in less than two months. The outcome of the Franco-Prussian conflict, although fighting persisted for over five months, was decided in less than seven weeks at the battle of Sedan. The bases for success of these two "short wars" were several. First, both were limited in nature - being neither wars of annihilation nor conquest. Second, the method of war termination had been planned for in advance. Third, politics rather than economic or ideological difference provided the impetus for conflict. Fourth, there were marked differences between the combatants in so far as planning staffs and military tactics are concerned and these were instrumental in the outcome of both conflicts. Finally, Prussian mobilization was sure and swift. Although successful in the context of these two wars, the "short war" planning of the Kaiser's General Staff was of dubious merit. If, in fact, "the wish becomes father to the thought," the desire to emulate the short war

successes of the 19th century played a disproportionate role in German planning for WWI. This 19th century concept of "attaque brusquee", while attractive and compelling in retrospect, was with rare exception, not to be achievable in the 20th century.³

World War I is a classic example of the failure of the short war philosophy. German planning and strategy from 1891 to 1914 embraced that theory. All planning conducted by the General Staff preparatory to the 4th of August 1914 was predicated on the concept of surprise, envelopment, and annihilation. Count Alfred Von Schleiffen, Chief of the German General Staff from 1891 to 1906, devoted much of his late years developing that concept. As a disciple of Clausewitz, he firmly believed that a quick victory could be achieved over France through a decisive first battle. Clausewitz had written that the purpose of war as a "continuation of policy by other means,"⁴ had as its main purpose the quick destruction of enemy fighting capability. "They must be put in such a condition that they can no longer carry on the fight."⁵ Thus, a strategy of quick mobilization and surprise attack clearly fit within the Clausewitz theory. The concept of a first decisive battle became the lynchpin of German strategy. Planning for a short war also had obvious practical and moral implications.⁶ A long war could not be scientifically planned for as could the short conflict; it would be easier to sustain the national support or will for a short period, and the short war was economically feasible.

Of the many variables essential to strategic planning, the role of alliances is critical. In the case of the Kaiser's Germany, this took the

form of an alliance with Austria. The Dual Alliance was able to field, on the eve of WWI, a force of 158 infantry and cavalry divisions. In opposition, the Allied Powers, which potentially included France, Russia, Great Britain, Belgium, and Serbia, had the capability of fielding a combined force of 249 divisions. Critical to German planning was the probable response of these nations in the event of an attack on France. Linked by a number of mutual defense treaties, there was certainty of response regarding the defense agreement between France and Russia. "If Russia were attacked by Germany or by Austria supported by Germany, France would use all of her available forces to attack Germany."⁷ Conversely, if France were first attacked, Russian forces would mobilize and attack the Prussian front. These mutual defense treaties insured that in any war in which she would be involved, "Germany would have to fight on two fronts."⁸

This certainty of response of both France and Russia was crucial in the short war plan of the Dual Alliance. Schlieffen, in accordance with the philosophy of Clausewitz, had developed his plan on the assumption that in order to be successful, Germany must "throw itself upon one enemy, the strongest, most powerful, most dangerous, and that can only be France."⁹ The basis for selecting France as the first point of attack was that the tactics of surprise and envelopment, when coupled with geography, would enable Germany to dispatch the French Army in the shortest period of time. The Schlieffen Plan allocated six weeks to defeat France. Coincidentally, this was identical to the time estimated for mobilization of the Russian Army.¹⁰ Before the Russians could launch a major offensive on the Prussian border, France would be defeated and the bulk of German forces could be redirected to the Eastern Front. The German General Staff drew upon a lesson from history/

in selecting France as the initial target of opportunity. Russia, if attacked first, could frustrate a quick victory by withdrawing to the interior, thus forcing Germany into a situation she refused to plan for - a prolonged war.

Success of the Schlieffen Plan of envelopment required violation of Belgian territory. Belgian response was uncertain. The German assumption was that either there would be no reaction or a modest show of force. This assumption suited well the short war planning as the timing of the overall plan would not allow for major resistance at this crucial phase. Belgian sovereignty was guaranteed by treaty. Great Britain was required by her obligations under that treaty to come to Belgium's aid should that sovereignty be violated. Although there were last minute German apprehensions as to the exact nature of a British response,¹¹ German optimism over the success of their "decisive first battle," led them to embrace the concept that, "in a short war English belligerency would not matter."¹²

PLANNING FOR THE LAST WAR

As August 4, 1914 dawned on the European continent, all the elements required for a major catastrophe were present. All elements of the German plan had been developed on the basis of "a short war." French planning had ignored the possibility of a surprise attack on the flank and oriented all forces forward in accordance with the philosophy of "offensive a outrance."¹³ The basis of the French Plan 17 (their counterpart of the Schlieffen Plan) was frontal attack, meeting the enemy head-on, and quick defeat.¹⁴ The quality of elan was the foundation on which a quick victory

over the Germans could be achieved. Even Russian strategy conceived of a quick victory over the Germans on the Prussian front. As Major General J. F. C. Fuller later wrote, "When the cards of World War I were played on August 4th, all of the players were strategically bankrupt."¹⁵ Most obviously, the German General Staff, after refining (and parenthetically diluting) the Schlieffen Plan, had, in effect, planned for the last war.¹⁶

Quite by accident, albeit for the wrong reasons, the Germans and other major combatants had confirmed Block's thesis. They learned no lesson from history and had, rather than attempting adaptation of the past to contemporary circumstances, emulated the last war by insistence on a short war/offensive strategy. The Block thesis was that with increased technology and firepower, defense was increasingly becoming the stronger form of war.¹⁷ The quick decisive battle was no longer the imperative. The writings of Clausewitz also spoke of war as an instrument of economic gain.¹⁸ While true in a world of agricultural orientation and limited destructive war fighting capability which existed during the time of Clausewitz, technological improvements in firepower and delivery, coupled with industrial/economic interdependence, had negated the concept of war for economic gain. International financial infrastructures, wrote Norman Angell, could not survive modern war and clearly war had become unprofitable and therefore untenable.¹⁹ This thesis, a variation on the Block theme, although accepted in principle by such luminaries as British Chief of Staff Sir John French, as well as by Viscount Esker, Chairman of the War Committee, had little impact on strategic planning prior to World War I.

That a prolonged war was highly probable did not go without notice. Chief of the German General Staff, General Von Moltke and his potential French opponent General Joseph Jaffre, both anticipated that the war would not be conducted and terminated as planned. Of contemporary strategists, only Lord Kitchner, appointed British War Minister on the day the war started, truly understood the inevitability of a long war and crafted his plans accordingly.

Thus it was, that as Europe geared itself for war, those who had formulated the theory and doctrine had not only overlooked the significant increase the role defense was to play in prolonging the conflict, they had, as Ziemke pointed out, "Seemingly gone out of their way to ignore it."²⁰ German industry and the general economy had not been prepared for the sustaining aspect of war fighting. Germany, for example, entered the war with only a six months supply of nitrites on hand for the manufacture of gunpowder.²¹ Not anticipating a defensive posture on the part of the French (resulting from last-minute changes in the German right wing envelopment), Germany suffered from a distinct lack of firepower. As Fuller points out, "Had a sufficiency of firepower existed during the mobility phase of the war, penetration [of the French lines] could have been great."²² On the contrary, however, they had neither the cannon nor shells to blast a gap in the French defensive position. They had not only failed to include the tactics of penetration, "they failed to consider that munitions supply is based upon industrial production."²³

The concept of short war was firmly fixed in the strategy of France, Russia and, most of all, Germany. An unwillingness to contemplate the

alternative would turn the war of annihilation into one of attrition. Had the impact on war fighting of increased firepower been truly considered, the Kaiser would never have told his force, "You will be home before the leaves have fallen from the trees."²⁴

History Repeats Itself

The ashes of WWI cooled on the European continent for twenty years. These two decades constituted a period of economic, industrial, political, and social trauma for most European nations. For Germany, however, this was a period of disaster. The Treaty of Versailles had extracted a price so high that, as Professor E. H. Carr wrote, "The victors of 1918 lost the peace in Central Europe because they continued to pursue a principle of political and economic disintegration..."²⁵ Rather than revitalizing Europe and eliminating the economic causes of war, the Treaty of Versailles had the opposite effect. The annexation, contributions and punitive damages assessed against Germany were the seeds from which, twenty years later, would spring World War II.

On September 1, 1939, German troops crossed the Polish border and twenty years of Armistice in Europe ended. The lessons of WWI had not been altogether ignored in preparation for World War II. Tactical and doctrinal changes had evolved during the period of the Armistice. Concepts of mechanized warfare were proposed by such leading figures as J. F. C. Fuller.²⁶ Incorporation of air operations with a mobile ground force was much touted as the future of warfare. If stalemate was the symbol of WWI,

German strategists were determined to eliminate that pitfall in any future conflict. The experience of WWI was that long wars were self-defeating.²⁷ From a purely practical standpoint (certainly not strategic necessity) evolved the concept of a series of short, limited objective campaigns - the Blitzkrieg. As Milward has observed, the concept of Blitzkrieg was misunderstood not only in Germany but outside as well.²⁸ Blitzkrieg embodied a number of concepts in addition to the literal translation of "lightning war." It had the practical effect of firming up political support within the country through demonstrative early success. In the case of Germany, it required no increased level of domestic investment for, in fact, between the years 1933 and 1938, Germany's military expenditures surpassed those of any other industrialized nation.²⁹ Given an economy geared to support military preparedness, prosecution of a series of short campaigns would not be disruptive to the consumer sector of the economy. In fact, until 1944 German consumers enjoyed a higher standard of living than did their counterparts in Britain.³⁰ Blitzkrieg strategy also provided the flexibility necessary to strike at targets of opportunity. Hitler's entire philosophy was opportunistic, and Blitzkrieg complemented that philosophy. Finally, the concept of flexibility and targets of opportunity did not require stockpiling or other defeatist preparation for protracted conflict.

Not only the Germans but the Japanese as well were influenced in their decisions for war by the conviction that war might be an instrument of economic gain.³¹ These economic benefits were seen by both governments as possessing short-term rewards which would have immediate political and social

value as well as long-term benefits to the well-being of each nation.

Geographic expansion - Lebensraum - has long been recognized as an imperative in Germany's strategy. This concept applied to a lesser degree to the Japanese. Japan, like Germany, was surrounded by a number of less productive and industrialized economies. She could expand her own economic base at the expense of those neighbors with virtually little adjustment of the economy to war purposes.³² There were other similarities between pre-war Germany and Japan. Both were extremely dependent on imports for economic well being and strategic potential. Japan imported fully two-thirds of required oil supplies and almost as great a portion of her iron ore requirements. Availability of strategic materials was critical to Japan and was key to her strategic planning and expansionist policies. Thus it was that Japan, as a result of constraints imposed by material shortages, economic considerations, social concerns and productive capability, emerged with a short-war strategy, key to the expansion of the empire by specific territorial objectives. Success was guaranteed by the preoccupation of European powers with Hitler's successes in the West, the perceived unpreparedness of the United States, and the belief that American mobilization would be slow in developing.³³

Of all the major antagonists only Britain's strategic planning embodied the premise of a long war. With a recognition that her industrial capacity and economic resources could not equal those of Germany, Britain undertook investment in qualitative forms of defense enhancement vis-a-vis research, development and innovation of weapons development. Inherently a long-term endeavor, research and development was of little value for a short war and

consequently was absent from the strategy of Blitzkrieg. Transformation of the civilian economy to one of total war was a concept understood by the British but never fully appreciated by the German leadership. The military objectives of Blitzkrieg were clear. The employment of mobility was intended not to annihilate but to penetrate, confuse, and cause panic. It was as much a psychological weapon as it was a military strategy. The success of the German Blitzkrieg depended not only on the surprise and psychological paralysis which it would engender, but also on the ability of the forces to sustain the initiative. Failure on the part of the German High Command to consider sustainability was disastrous. While economic potential can compensate for weak military preparedness (as in the case of pre-war America), no amount of military action is achievable in the long term if the economic potential for sustainment has not been considered.

In the final analysis, WWII differed from WWI only in employment of forces and in the applied technology of the era. The strategy of short war and the failure to mobilize industry for the long haul, as Ziemke points out, have proven to be disastrous twice in this century. Initial successes [vis-a-vis Blitzkrieg] have been no guarantee of ultimate victory.

Looking Forward

Short war advocates argue that long war is no longer affordable and, therefore, it is fruitless to plan for it. Yet in post-WWII history, the "short war" has been protracted. The Korean Conflict, thought by some to be the precursor to NWIII, extended for three years. The United States was able

to mobilize its Armed Forces and its industrial capacity because of the regional aspect of the conflict. But in a post-Korean environment, the U.S. and its major allies ignored the lessons of history and chose not to plan for a long war.³⁵ The acquisition by the Soviet Union of nuclear weapons prompted the creation of NSC 68, which proposed a concept of rapid escalation from conventional to nuclear when the capability to engage in the next conventional battle is exhausted.

In the Post-Korean period has technological evalution negated the need to plan for a long war? In the contemporary sense the short-war argument focuses on duration of conflict and avoids discussion of war termination criterion. Surprise, mobility, deadly and massive firepower, and weapons on the leading edge of technology all seem to support the short war theorists contention that conflict of long duration cannot be sustained. Their premise is that the concept of war or a series of battles and campaigns, wherein one combatant may lose the initial engagement yet survive to achieve ultimate victory (e. g., Britain in WWII), is no longer possible. Short war proponents point to the Arab-Israeli Wars of 1967 and 1973 as examples of the short war strategy. Their more contemporary example is that of the Falklands War. In not one of the three examples cited above, they argue, could the victor sustain a long war effort. Their premise falls short, however, as it can be argued that none of those conflicts have satisfied a vital condition of war-the issue of final and lasting conflict termination. What are the objectives of the potential adversary? Under what circumstances will he terminate conflict? With high technology must one automatically assume escalation from conventional to

nuclear? In the context of another European conflict, one cannot discount the continued importance of a war of annihilation with no or limited nuclear involvement. With conventional force superiority, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that the Soviets would launch an "attaque brusquee" for purposes of securing quick geographic and economic gain.

Failure to plan for the long war alternative proved to be disasterous in both world wars. In WWII Germany geared for a series of short battles but did not mobilize its industrial capacity. The United States used prolonged warning to energize its industrial potential. Britain planned for the long war, lost the first battle, and sustained itself on to victory. These are three distinct examples of national policy, two of which resulted in military strategy and planning focusing on the long rather than short nature of conflict.

The following chapters will address, in some detail, the specific nature of the contemporary "long war/short war" debate, as well as some policy initiatives which will enable decisionmakers to view the "long war/short war dilemma" in other than an "either or" context.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER II (Pages 6-18)

¹J. F. C. Fuller, The Conduct of War 1798-1961, Rutgers University Press, 1961, p. 129.

²Ibid., p. 128.

³Note: Modifications of the French offensive doctrine have been successful in Russian takeover of Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

⁴Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 645.

⁵Ibid., p. 90.

⁶Earl F. Ziemke, Annihilation, Attrition, and the Short War, Parameters, the Journal of the U.S. Army War College, Vol. XII, No. 1, p. 24.

⁷Barbara W. Tuckman, The Guns of August, The MacMillan Company, New York, 1962, p. 88.

⁸Ibid., p. 13.

⁹Ibid., p. 19.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 19.

¹¹Ibid., p. 118.

¹²Ibid., p. 120.

¹³Note: Embodies the concept of unlimited offensive. Defense is discarded.

¹⁴Ferdinand Foch, The Principles of War, (London: Chapman and Hall, 1918), p. 17.

¹⁵Fuller, p. 154.

¹⁶Tuckman, p. 22.

¹⁷Fuller, p. 129.

¹⁸Clausewitz, p.

19 Tuckman, p. 10.

20 Ziemke, p. 23.

21 Tuckman, p. 119.

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25 E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years of Crisis, 1940, p. 294.

26 Ziemke, p. 26.

27 Alan S. Melward, War Economy and Society, University of California Press, Berkely, 1977, p. 26.

28 Ibid., p. 23.

29 Note: According to H. C. Helman, The Economic Structure of Hitler's Europe, Oxford Press, 1954, German military expenditures for that period exceed those of England and France by 239% and 263% respectively.

30 Melward, p. 76.

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CHAPTER III

THE CURRENT SITUATION

What is the Long War and Short War Debate All About?

On the one hand some address the strategic aspects of a predetermined plan to conduct an aggressive battle resulting in the destruction of enemy forces. Others talk about a protracted conflict resulting from inadequate planning for the combat forces. The current Secretary of Defense believes the short war philosophy is fallacious and we must not plan for it.¹ Ironically, the essence of the resultant debates (and opinions) is our preparedness to conduct warfare of short or long duration in terms of adequate warning and sustainability. When one looks at our current military posture, resulting from years of neglect and inadequate attention to the threat potential of the Soviets, we have spent years maintaining a relatively small, 1965-vintage equipped force. So, how do we characterize the contrasting concepts of long and short wars?

Short War: Based on 7-10 days of friendly warning of Soviet aggressive intention against the U.S. or her allies, M-Day Forces and their related war reserve stocks will deploy to the threatened area. Combat consumption will come from M-Day inventories with no support from the industrial base. Portions of the M-Day force are forward-deployed (Europe and Korea) as are war reserve stocks for the balance of M-Day Force. There is a heavy reliance on Reserve and Guard units, some of which are "roundout" units which will deploy with active component forces. Once combat begins, U.S. access to critical

materials abroad is denied or minimized. Based on current war reserve stocks, inventories will exhaust in two weeks, less if NATO or Korean forces need to tap into our inventory. There are several generic groups of Short War proponents: The first group believes the battle must (will) be won or lost in the first campaign (a matter of weeks). They are judging need in terms of what is. The second group believes that duration is not critical - it's all a question of how much we can afford in the budget process. Put the money into strategic force deterrence rather than the day we hope never comes. A third group follows onto the first and second by saying that nuclear weapons will be used by both sides as soon as one or the other perceives a potential defeat, thereby escalating the theater campaign to strategic nuclear warfare. The United States will prevail by virtue of second strike capability (or lose because of its absence). In either case, the end will come quickly. A fourth group follows the second group by saying a conventional war in Europe is too costly in terms of population (Post-World War II concern) and the conflict must be resolved early by the forward deployed forces or nuclear weapons, if necessary.

Long War: Based on 6-12 months of friendly warning of Soviet aggressive intentions against the U.S. or her allies, the President declares mobilization.* The draft is implemented and industry begins increasing the output by accelerated production. The national stockpile will help industry to sustain the surge pace. Forward deployed forces and equipment will be brought up to full strength. Industry transforms its output from peacetime goods to weapons and supplies. Proponents believe that the United States'

greatest wartime asset has been its ability to mobilize manpower, industry and economy to provide the best quantities of war materiel for our forces and those of our allies. Only through total mobilization preparedness can we provide a credible deterrence to remind a potential aggressor that the United States cannot be knocked out with a quick punch.³ There are essentially two groups of proponents: First, those who believe U.S. economic and industrial capacity is superior to that of the U.S.S.R.; second, those who do not believe the first series of campaigns are critical to prevailing. The U.S. industrial capability will salvage the failure of our allies to prevail. For this group of proponents, the initial campaign trades space for time to gear up the national process. (By some, this is also known as Trip Wire.)

Lamentably, since the 1960's, the U.S. has slowly lengthened the distance away from its historically strongest weapon - the industrial base. From 1960 to 1975 we used the industrial base to support what we felt was "enough" to

*Mobilization: "The act of preparing for war or other emergency through assembling and organizing national resources," and "The process by which the Armed Forces or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. It involves a declaration of national emergency by the President and a significant change in the way the DOD and the nation do their business."²

defend ourselves, and we concentrated on "D to P"^{*} Planning and Programming. During the same period, our nuclear strength was unquestioned, so we continued with a program which has ultimately forced industry away from defense while at the same time our nuclear superiority has become at best only parity. From 1975-1980, recognizing (and resigning ourselves to) the "realities" of what we didn't have, we concentrated on Short Warning and Short War.

As we enter the 1980's, it now seems we are attempting a different orientation based on potential global conflict of indefinite duration. While the Service Chiefs attempt to modernize the force under the heading of Readiness, OSD and the President are strengthening our Strategic Force and attempting to negotiate nuclear balance. Still and all, industry has not satisfactorily been brought back into the process. As has been determined by some, there is an urgent need to: accelerate implementation of recent OSD initiatives to turn this around; create a single DOD institutional focus for defense industry uses (particularly the implementation of a cohesive procurement program); develop contractor incentives; and introduce increased competition among contractors.⁴

In an era where we are attempting to stabilize nuclear armament, we need something other than an inadequately equipped conventional force to serve as a deterrent to World War III. Increased war reserve stocks in prepositioned

*D to P Concept: Relates the amount of required production to a time period defined as the beginning of item consumption (D-Day) to attainment of steady state emergency production (P-Day).

locations throughout the world could be adequate for our conventional force, if we were to create a sufficient lift capability to transport that force. It is painfully obvious that if the size of war reserve stocks is not increased to provide an adequate initial sustainment, based on stated service requirements, the amount of industrial sustainment beginning at some point (as war reserve stocks are exhausted) will not help. There must be a smooth handoff between these two occurrences. Right now there is a shortfall known as the "D to P disconnect". We cannot, with currently inadequate funding of war reserves, guarantee sustainment of the conventional force for more than 15 days (general consensus). Industry will not be able to deliver the critical line items earlier than the second year after they begin production. And we have allowed the industrial base to erode so far that it cannot adequately surge production to offset our known shortfalls.

In May 1981, the GAO addressed most of these points,⁵ and in March 1982 a DOD Task Force provided recommended policy changes.⁶ If the services heed the guidance of SECDEF, by end of FY 89 (with partial improvements in '85 and '87) we will have developed an industrial base capability which will permit accelerating the attainment of our programmed sustainability levels for selected critical systems. In the meanwhile the United States will, per force, only be capable of fighting a short war with the U.S.S.R., or a protracted war with Soviet proxies.

Is There an Operative Policy?

The U.S. does have a policy, but there is a need to develop new programs in order to "correct the major weaknesses in our defense and give us the margin of safety necessary to preserve the peace."⁷ This need for a new

series of programs existed in the 1960s and the 1970s when we should have reinvested in our defense effort, but didn't. Starting with the FY 83 budget, DOD established four tasks, the satisfaction of which would correct the major deficiencies addressed by SECDEF. These tasks include: (1) enhance the ability of U.S. forces to respond to warning; (2) increase the state of force readiness; (3) enhance preparations for military mobilization; and (4) to repair national capacity to expand defense production rapidly during a crisis.⁸

But what kind of war are we preparing to fight - Conventional or Nuclear? The Defense Guidance says we are building our conventional forces to be able to respond to Soviet expansionism practically anywhere in the world. We are obviously committed to protracted conflict, because of our goal to prevail once we get involved. But are we in fact funding and executing programs which will allow us to conduct a protracted conventional war involving the U.S.S.R.? The answer is a definite maybe. And here we begin to see the need for discussing the difference between policies, strategy, programs and the budget.

There can be no argument that the United States has stated its policies, and from these policies have come strategies - both national and military. However, it's one thing for the Executive to state the policies and for the Secretary of Defense to approve the strategies. It's something altogether different when it comes to the Service Chiefs funding the programs which support the strategies. Within DOD there are differences of opinion (ultimately expressed in terms of support to the categories of the budget) as to which budget lines support which strategy. At the OSD level, the emphasis

is on implementing management and organizational changes and updating Master Plans to offset identified shortfalls related to the "fallacy" of "short war". In his FY 83 Annual Report to the Congress, Secretary Weinberger pointed out that he had initiated some efforts to "overcome the 'short war' fallacy" (generated by previous defense policy).⁹ However, it fell to the Service Chiefs to initiate specific actions and fund the budget. The fact of the matter is: When given the choice between (a) modernizing the conventional force for the sake of readiness, or (b) funding money to bring the war reserve stocks to a sustainable level, the Service Chiefs, with the possible exception of the Army, support (a). Army is attempting to satisfactorily fund both needs. With decentralized execution of the budget and because the CINC's are now involved in the validation process, there is much more emphasis on force modernization and equipment fielding, because these are things to which everyone can relate. There is little evidence that the Services, exclusive of the Army, are doing much to improve war reserve stocks. Although industrial preparedness has been emphasized at the OSD level, service support varies. The Army provides a "top down" approach to Industrial Preparedness Planning (IPP).^{*} The Army mobilization Critical Items List (CIL) is the catalyst

*Industrial Preparedness Planning: The industrial base encompasses "those elements of American industry that contribute to defense-related work and whose production capacity and technical expertise are required to meet national security requirements. Planning for industrial preparedness entails development of plans that will, when acted on, enhance readiness to support mobilization. IPP analysis may, for example, identify measures that can eliminate production bottlenecks or shorten production times.¹⁰

for planning in the Materiel Command Organization. Thorough review of the CIL by the Department of the Army Staff promotes use of valid mobilization requirements and realistic planning assumptions. The CIL is a "spin off" of Army Long-Range Research, Development and Acquisition (LRRDA) Plan process which is timed to support and complement the Programming, Planning and Budgeting System (PPBS). The Navy continues to invest in force structure expansion, modernization, and readiness. With the exception of war reserve stocks, the IPP facet of sustainability is receiving little attention. There still remains a need for increased manning for IPP within the Navy Staff.¹¹ The Air Force has signed up (in spirit) to the new OSD guidance, but their programs are not any better than the Navy.

Absent throughout the system is the determination of military requirements using a consistent and meaningful set of values. Under review, the Services are not "playing from the same sheet of music," and unless a coherent statement of requirements is established and agreed upon there will be an incoherent planning base to support the long overdue policies.

How Does Nuclear Warfare Factor Into The Discussion?

In assessing this policy issue, there is a strong temptation to exclude it, because it falls in the Strategic Forces aspect of the budget, and the "too hard" box for conventional warfare planners. On the other hand, there is a temptation to designate it as the prime factor for determining the duration of conflict. However, our military planners have recently attempted to make the nuclear issue a singularly identifiable aspect of resolve or National Will.

Since the Carter Administration expressed its concern vis-a-vis Presidential Review Memorandum 10 (PRM-10), there is growing apprehension at the Executive level over the United States' strategic doctrine. PRM-10, also known as the "Comprehensive Net Assessment and Military Force Posture Review," was viewed by the JCS as a budget-making tool of President Carter. In point of fact, it was an interagency attempt to describe the desired theory of how to fight a nuclear war. Although the final version of PRM-10's Annex C outlived four strategic options and contained grudgingly-surrendered input by the JCS as to how much was enough, it did not address how to "fight the war." From PRM-10 came Presidential Directive 18, which directed several follow-up studies to include a review of the National Targeting Policy. In July 1980, President Carter signed Presidential Directive 59, which was a restatement of American Strategic Doctrine. Among other things, PD-59 placed heavy emphasis on the command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) needed to fight a nuclear war over a period of months. It implied a theory of nuclear attrition and it promised Soviet leaders that they would be hunted down in their new blast-hardened shelters if things went the limit.¹²

This paper will not go into the resultant studies from which came Countervailing Strategy and Countervalue Targets. Neither will it attempt to address the moral aspects of continued dependence on nuclear weaponry as a deterrent. The fact remains that the revised U.S. nuclear policy and its related strategies continue to deter Soviet aggression against the U.S. and her allies. It is this deterrence which is the number one objective for the United States. Current U.S. policy establishes four purposes for the nuclear

forces which are responsible for executing the policy: (1) To deter nuclear attack on the United States or its allies; (2) To help deter major conventional attack...; (3) Impose termination of a major war...; and (4) Negate possible Soviet nuclear blackmail. Finally, and of importance to this paper, "This Administration does not regard nuclear strength as a substitute for conventional strength."¹³

If the nuclear forces are unable to successfully accomplish their first two purposes, the United States will employ these forces to guarantee the last two purposes. As unprepared as we may be to sustain a conventional war, and the follow-on Theater Nuclear War, or a Strategic Nuclear War, the inability to sustain one is just as much a factor for the others. As that ability is constrained, so also is the conflict.

What Are Some Of The Problems We Face In Sustaining Conventional Warfare

From the standpoint of warfare, conventional warfare is easiest to plan for and the most resource demanding when done correctly. Sustained conventional warfare planning absorbs more resources over a longer period of time; requires more attention to requirements; and conflicts with accepted readiness priorities and force modernization.

From 1968-1975, defense procurement decreased from \$44 billion to \$17 billion in constant dollars, resulting in the lowest level of procurement since immediately after World War II. This unilateral disarmament resulted in a situation where it would have taken over three years to increase production significantly from current production lines. "Even with increasing defense

budgets, the results have been: reduced force readiness and sustainability; declining industrial productivity and responsiveness; and greatly reduced quantities of military equipment - all badly needed for force buildup and modernization.¹⁴

Although the results are not just related to the industrial base it is worth looking at that area simply to better understand why we cannot presently sustain conventional warfare. Since 1976 several enlightened people have written about the problem, but only in 1980 did we see a flood of authoritative studies which specifically addressed the causes, effects and possible solutions.

There are four major bottlenecks in the defense industrial base. These are: critical parts, skilled labor, modern production equipment and imported raw materials. We have insufficient critical parts because competent subcontractors (lower tier) have been driven out of the process through low profit, small volume, one-year orders, cyclical demands and excessive regulations. Skilled labor has been dissipating through a decline in the number of defense contractors and higher overhead costs for training and recruiting. This results in reduced output and turbulence among the ranks of skilled and mobile workforce. Most production equipment is inefficient and over twenty years old. There is little available space in existing facilities to expand and there is little incentive to invest in more equipment or modernization. Raw materials play a special role in the discussion due to the fact that most of the more exotic and high-purity materials are imported. The United States' stockpile has not been efficiently updated in twenty years,¹⁵ and much work must be done in this area.

The overall effect of these bottlenecks in peacetime is not so much an impact on our preparedness as it is on the higher costs being paid for less. Unless and until DOD seriously addresses the requirements issue, we will not only pay more for less, but we will also take longer to prepare an industrial base capable of sustaining the combat forces. Recent initiatives by former Deputy Secretary of Defense Carlucci could improve the situation. Of the 32 total "Carlucci Initiatives," most of them attempt to fix five major areas: the defense planning and budgeting process; initial program budgets; competition in defense procurement; contractor incentives to make productivity enhancing capital investments; and R&D planning. Most people in OSD will say that these initiatives are dynamic, but few have been acted upon to any significant degree. There is a particular problem in getting the OSD staffers to translate these initiatives into policies which the Services can implement. DOD Directives 5000.1 and 5000.2 explain the processes and the rules of the game, but emphasis and understanding are not coherent throughout DOD.

Having looked at one ingredient of the sustainability issue, let's now look at the other most important one - War Reserve Stocks. The more expanded our commitment around the world, the more need there is for prepositioned stocks. Similarly, there is an expanded need on the part of the active and reserve forces (which are also expanding) to have a higher level of self-sufficiency. These units also compete with an increasing Military Sales Program which also needs more equipment. There is not enough equipment to go

around. This problem is further compounded by the fact that we simultaneously attempt to serve several masters.

The critical issues are technology and economics. In Central Europe strategic planning calls for the preposition of six divisions sets of equipment. In spite of the FY 80-84 Consolidated Guidance, this had not been accomplished. There is not enough equipment for those sites' deployed or deploying units. In many cases, equipment for the existing units came from CONUS-based units, which have more equipment than people by virtue of reduced Authorized Levels of Organization. But what happens as we begin to field new equipment at much higher line item cost? We can't afford to stock that equipment; and if units are deployed to Europe (between now and 1986), those units will "fall in" on equipment that they had not trained with in CONUS. Those units need to have with them the equipment they have trained with if they are to be combat effective.

The aforementioned problem is not as serious as the basic problem of ammunition, mobile hospitals, fuel and parts. There continues to be a serious shortfall in these areas which, together with equipment replacements, means that the forces in Central Europe may (only may) be able to sustain themselves for a period of 5 to 15 days - as opposed to the 90 days stated by some.

There have been many studies on the need to define and identify specific needs for war reserves and production base. Probably the most comprehensive study is the SECRET Sustainability Study prepared by OSD and the Services in October 1979.¹⁶ There is a basic belief held by war reserve proponents that if we do not prepare a sufficiently large war reserve capability (say 90

days), it doesn't make any difference how much sustainment you get from the industrial base at D+180, because the war will be over, or we will have given up the terrain we were supposed to defend. It calls to mind an old parody that starts off - "For want of a nail..." Obviously, if there were an overlap between war reserve and industrial base support, the entire discussion would be unnecessary. But there is an unacceptable gap between our D-Day sustainment reserves and the arrival of necessary items from industry after mobilization or surge. There are some who favor a 45 day stockage rather than 90 days because our allies are only preparing a 14 day stockage level. But those same allies favor early use of nuclear weapons rather than protracted conventional warfare.¹⁷

The Services have identified their war reserve requirements, but they have not funded them in the budget. Emphasis is on fielding equipment and units in the active and reserve forces, a result of the "first things first" syndrome created by the Planning Programming Budget System (PPBS). It has become more important to modernize the force and keep it ready in peacetime for the first battle in wartime than it is to prepare for its sustainment once the first battle blends into the second and third.

Mobility is the next problem we face. Currently, and projected through 1988, if we must deploy our forces to counter Soviet aggression, we do not have the necessary lift capability to do so. If we keep all of the Navy Battle Groups on station in potentially critical areas, we can deploy a minimal force which will be followed in 72 hours by elements of the Rapid Deployment Force, and some 30-35 days later the initial mechanized force.

The Services are attempting to fix this with development and fielding of "fast ships" and more cargo aircraft, but those fixes are only on the horizon.

Manpower is also a problem. We may be accessing and retaining sufficient numbers for peacetime and a low-level threat conflict, but there are other considerations to be made if we are to support median and high-threat levels of conflict. Present procurement policy calls for 2.1 million active duty personnel - one million for Selected Reserves and several hundred thousand for the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). This requires an annual accession of 400,000 to 500,000 people. The 18 year old male population will decline steadily until 1986, reaching a projected low of 1.783 million, which is an 18% drop from 1979. By 1989, it will grow to 1.895 million, which is on the order of 150,000 below the average prevailing in the 1970's. There is a serious shortage of manpower in the Army IRR. By 1988 there will still be a shortage of 240,000 enlisted soldiers with combat-related skills.¹⁸

These realities are further complicated by the primary Defense concern posed by the threat of increased Soviet hardware and its deployment. The current low state of the economy and concomittant high unemployment made enlistment attractive and have helped retain the junior noncommissioned officers. There are too many economy-related domestic issues to allow the current Administration and Congress to consider restoring the draft or expanding the current registration system to incorporate preclassification. Public response would be devisive of any attempts to improve the macro-economic situation. The current image of the U.S. Armed Forces, together with the perceived demphasized threat of overt Soviet expansionism, detracts from any need to expand the force.

Within the constraints of the economy, the current apportionment of men and materiel is deemed adequate. There is no desire by Defense to expand the force structure at the expense of improved materiel acquisition. If our only concern through the year 2000 is to maintain peacetime strength and be able to fight in low-threat conventional combat, we have to continue our current programs and incorporate some new incentives (educational and financial) to attract personnel into the understrength IRR - or we must adjust our needs for the IRR downward.

Diplomacy and Defense are no longer distinct alternatives one to be used where the other fails, both must complement each other. Accordingly, the armed forces must be adequate to meet national commitments and to insure national security, unfettered by arbitrary budget ceilings.

It should be clear by now how important the aspect of mobilization is to offsetting these problems. So much depends on our ability to mobilize in time to allow the industrial might and the additional manpower to come together and carry on the battle. It would be wonderful to say that the current U.S. capability, together with our allies, could carry the battle successfully in 60 days and destroy the Soviet will to persevere on the battlefield without resorting to nuclear weapons - and if she did so, that the United States would prevail by virtue of assured second strike. Through the 1990's it won't happen unless we change our ways.

Ironically, one factor of our nuclear deterrent is also an indispensable aspect of successful mobilization. Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I) initiatives to enhance Strategic Forces must surely be

causing concern in Moscow. These same initiatives play an indispensable role for improved industrial base responsiveness; priority fill; and use of wartime reserves, mobility and manpower. By and large, the more warning we receive (albeit ambiguous) and the quicker it is analyzed, the more time becomes available to the National Command Authority to simultaneously enter into deterrent policies and negotiations, while also mobilizing industry and the military. Enhanced C3I serves multiple purposes and has the greatest potential for successful solution to two distinctly different but related problems.

The United States cannot afford to plan for a Short War. If we plan for anything short of destruction of the enemy, we are remiss. Neither can we continue to bear the economic brunt of worst-case analysis and its solutions. There must be a prudent, deliberate effort to provide the necessary resource base in peacetime which could be responsive in wartime. A tiny fraction of our defense budget allocated to plans and preparations for industrial mobilization could vastly increase our ability rapidly to expand our military strength - to improve both our nuclear deterrent and our conventional forces. The better prepared this capacity for expansion, the more convincing it will be to a possible enemy, and the less likely that it will have to be used.¹⁹

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER III (Pages 21-37)

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CHAPTER IV
ANALYZING THE DEBATE

Fallacies In The Debate

As the previous chapters have shown, the short-war vs. long-war debate is neither unique to the United States nor is it a phenomenon of 1980's. The issues are not as simple as first appearances may indicate. Several fallacies exist in this debate as it is currently structured.

The first of these fallacies is that which equates short warning with short war. The argument runs that the USSR is capable of conducting a military mobilization and attack against NATO within two weeks, and that NATO will not be able to use its industrial base in time to be effective before the war. Further, since neither side will be able to sustain its forces for the extended time required before its industrial base can close the "D-P gap," the war a priori will be a short one. The fallacy of this argument is that it denies both the possibility of a long war occurring with short warning, as well as any possibility of long warning. This approach equates warning time with military mobilization. Yet, prior to both World War I and II, several years of increasing political tensions provided ample time to begin industrial mobilization for those countries which chose to use it, therefore, even though there was relatively short warning time as to the exact outbreak of hostilities, in both wars there was time to conduct industrial mobilization. There is no reason to assume a similar political warning period will not be available in the future.

A second fallacy is that any war in Europe will be a short war because neither the Warsaw Pact (WP) nor the European allies are willing or able to sustain a protracted conventional war on their soil. The argument runs that if it appears that such a situation appears to be likely. One side will either agree to truce/peace talks or initiate use of tactical nuclear weapons which will quickly escalate to a general strategic nuclear exchange. While the quick escalation to nuclear warfare was part of the NATO strategy in the 1950's this is no longer the case. Furthermore, the possibility that both sides will exercise restraint is more than a remote possibility, with some historical precedence. In World War II all of the major participants refrained from the use of chemical weapons after the experiences of World War I. Also, during the Korean War, for whatever reasons, the United States chose not to employ nuclear weapons against China. Thus, if a protracted conventional war were to develop in such a way that none of the major nuclear powers felt that their continued existence was in immediate danger, there is a great likelihood that they would refrain from the use of nuclear weapons or confine their use to a relatively benign environment such as at sea or in space.

The third fallacy in the debate is the line of reasoning based on the Arab-Israeli Wars. This line asserts that the combined arms tactics and battlefield violence of these wars were the closest experiences to the battlefield conditions expected to exist in a conflict involving the US/NATO and the USSR/WP. Therefore, since the countries involved in the Arab-Israeli Wars were unable or unwilling to sustain the high intensity combat over an extended period of time, the US/NATO and the USSR/WP will also be unable to

maintain combat operations for an extended period of time. While it is probable that the high intensity combat operations of the Arab-Israeli Wars cannot be maintained indefinitely, it does not follow that the opponents will cease combat if they are unable to sustain high intensity combat operations. Witness the Iran-Iraq experience. History provides a parallel in that the general opinion prior to World War I was that it would be a short war. This opinion was held not only by the general population but by the majority of the military experts in all the countries involved. The pre-World War I thinking came from the experiences of the Franco-Prussian and Austro-Prussian Wars of 1866 and 1870.¹ The conditions and experiences of these wars were as relevant to predicting the nature and duration of World War I as the Arab-Israeli Wars are for predicting the nature and duration of World War III.

The fourth fallacy is that industrial mobilization is irrelevant in a short war because the war will be over before the industrial base can contribute to the war effort. While this is true for a short warning-short war scenario, it is still a misleading argument. As warning time increases, the more the industrial base can contribute to the war effort, assuming that industrial mobilization measures are taken well in advance of manpower mobilization measures. Finally, as Sanders and Muckerman point out in their paper, "Toward a Concept for Substantial Response," if we were involved in a major short conventional war, such as a Warsaw Pact attack on NATO in Central Europe, we would still mobilize (including our industrial base) regardless of the outcome. These authors point out that such mobilization would be greater than that required to replace the losses incurred during the war.² Due to the

increased international tensions and uncertainty, we would probably increase our force structure and readiness. Therefore, it is suggested that a significant level of industrial mobilization will be required even for a short warning-short war scenario.

A short war strategy relies on existing war reserve stocks and current production levels vice mobilization of the industrial base to sustain its forces. A country can fight for a considerable period of time, especially if it is able to fight a series of successful campaigns without incurring excessive material losses. In World War II Germany was able to follow such a strategy from 1939 until its invasion of the Soviet Union bogged down in 1942.³ In this regard, Israel's series of wars with its Arab neighbors can be regarded as a series of campaigns in a single long war from the Arab point of view. It is possible for a war to continue for an extended period of time while one or more of the belligerents pursues a short war strategy.

Key Issues

In assessing the long-war vs. short-war arguments, the key issues in this debate are the role and impact of warning, and mobilization in the scenarios postulated by the opposing factions.

In many respects the different estimates on the amount of warning time available and our ability to act upon it shape the dissenting views on the nature and duration of the combat in the next war. Both sides would agree that the long-war vs. short-war debate is irrelevant if we had unequivocal warning of an enemy's intention several months in advance. However, given the

current technical systems such clear warning far in advance of the attack is unlikely to occur. On the other hand, there are those who believe that any warning will be measured in days or weeks as the enemy armed forces mobilize for war. This is an underlying premise of many of the advocates of a short-war strategy.

Using history as an example, it would appear that we should expect a period, measured in months, of what has been termed ambiguous warning. This is a period of rising political tensions with some indications that military action is a possibility, but with a high degree of uncertainty as to exactly when, where and even if the enemy actually plans to attack. In both World Wars, there were ample indications that there was a definite possibility of war in the near future (i.e., next few years) but short or no warning of the actual time or place of the initial attacks. Indeed, in his book, "Stratagem, Deception and Surprise in War,"⁴ Barton Whaley points out that, in general, the problem is not one of having no warning of enemy intentions, but rather a problem of correctly interpreting the information available, a task made more difficult by the enemy's deception efforts. In general, strategic surprise has been achieved by misdirection. The problem we face is not solely one of short warning, but also of correctly interpreting the information available in a timely manner. We must also realize that we will have to deal with uncertain or ambiguous warning up until weeks, days or possibly minutes before the actual attack.

The second key issue deals with mobilization as a function of warning. In

this regard, the short-war premise is that we must fight a "come as you are war." This is because (a) we will have a short period of warning (days or weeks); and (b) we will be unable to mobilize our industrial base or expand beyond our current force structure in time to contribute to the fight. This argument postulates that Industrial Mobilization is the limiting factor, because we have always been able to mobilize troops far faster than we can equip them. It could be years before industrial mobilization would have an impact on the outcome of the war because the development and production times for equipment are so long.⁵

There is also a tendency to regard mobilization as an "on" or "off" process. In actual fact, mobilization is a continuum composed of incremental and sometimes overlapping steps.⁶ Therefore, many mobilization steps can be taken in response to and during the relatively long ambiguous warning period we can expect prior to a formal decision to declare a state of mobilization. This is exactly what the United States did in the months prior to World War II. From 1939 to 1941, war production rose from 2% to 10% of the GNP.⁷ The majority of the weapons technologies used in World War II were in development prior to 1939.⁶ In addition, a draft was instituted three months prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. The United States therefore, had taken a number of steps to prepare for war in response to a warning which was both short (in predicting the actual attacks to start the war) and long (in indicating that a war with Japan was possible as early as 1939).

A Spectral Approach

For which war should the United States prepare--Long or Short? The answer is not a simple choice between two alternatives. As we have shown, the issues are more complex. The choices are not, in reality, limited to one of two courses of action. Given the current Defense Policy, the United States must plan and be prepared for a wide variety of likely scenarios. What is required is the realization that the preparedness planning for these scenarios represent a spectrum of warning length and conflict duration. What is necessary is a spectral approach to defense preparedness and mobilization planning, and for balancing the requirements of readiness, modernization, and sustainability. The United States and its allies must be prepared for the short war by having sufficient equipment for the reserves and for sustained operations under brief high-intensity conditions. However, we must also plan and spend money to improve our industrial surge and mobilization capability. The costs involved are small, but the potential effectiveness is high.⁹

Under a spectral approach, the relative merits of funding a readiness item versus a sustainability item would be balanced against the probability of the scenarios which each one supports. Currently the bulk of the defense dollars goes to support readiness of conventional forces. However, by emphasizing the incremental return on investment relative to the current defense posture, a greater overall increase in force effectiveness is achievable. The increase in total force effectiveness will be far greater for the few dollars spent on industrial preparedness for an extended conflict than if the same money were to be spent on adding a small number of pieces of equipment to the current forces.¹⁰

In this vein, LTC Tim Gill a National Defense University Research Fellow, has proposed a process of marginal diversion; that is, an evaluation of the cost benefit of buying one less major weapon, such as an aircraft or tank, and using the money for stockpiling more spare parts to support the major weapons already deployed.

The major problem for industrial mobilization planning centers on the development of the necessary data base and plans to support an incremental set of industrial preparedness measures which can be implemented as necessary during the relatively long periods of ambiguous warning as political tensions increase.

Table 1 shows some of these measures and their impact on production rates and capacities. Figure 1 shows the relative impact of these measures for a hypothetical piece of tactical equipment. Curves 1-3 assume a "warm base;" while curves 4-6 are for a "cold base." Inventories of long-lead-time materials and special tooling have significant impacts in both cases.¹¹ Under the conditions of increasing tension, an incremental turning-on of the industrial base, particularly for long-lead items and special tooling should be adopted. This turning-on of the industrial base has the advantage of increasing industrial readiness, while lacking the potential destabilizing features of manpower mobilization. Current planning does not consider this option of incremental industrial mobilization steps in response to the spectrum of warning conditions.¹²

Table 1

Types and Impacts of Industrial-Preparedness Measures

	<u>Impact</u>			<u>Reduce Requirements</u>
	<u>Decrease Lead Time</u>	<u>Increase Prod., Accel. Rate</u>	<u>Increase Max Capacity</u>	
Provide gov't facilities	X	X	X	--
Retain gov't facilities (PEP)	X	X	X	--
Additional Special tooling	X	X	X	--
Prestock mfg. mat'l and components	X	X	--	--
Develop multiple sources	--	X	X	--
Maintain warm base	X	X	--	--
Increase reliability of equipment	X	X	--	X
Identify substitute items	X	X	--	X
Develop wartime spec. changes	X	X	--	X
Use commercial Items	X	X	--	X
Use standard electronic components	X	X	--	X

Source: Gansler, The Defense Industry, p. 118




Figure 1
Comparison of some industrial-preparedness measures listed in table 5.3. (For these examples, "warm base" means current production on the order of 1,500 units per month.)
(1) Warm base, prestocked manufacturing materials, additional special tooling; (2) warm base with only special tooling; (3) warm base alone; (4) cold base, prestocked materials, special tooling; (5) cold base with only prestocked materials; (6) cold base alone.

Source: Ganader, p. 119

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER IV (Pages 40-49)

¹Theodore Rapp, War in the Modern World, Collier Books, 1962, p. 204.

²Ralph Sanders, and Joesph E. Muckerman, , "Toward a Concept of Sustained Response," draft, p. 4.

³Alan S. Milward, War Economy and Society, University of California Press, Burkely, 1977, p. 78.

⁴Barton Whaley, Stratagem, Deception and Surprise in War, 1969, p 17.

⁵Sanders and Muckerman, p. 4.

⁶Jacques S. Gansler, The Defense Industry, MIT Press, 1982, p. 109.

⁷Milward, p. 63.

⁸Ibid, p. 175.

⁹Gansler, p. 110.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 110.

¹¹Ibid., p. 117.

¹²Ibid., p. 118.

CHAPTER V
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary

The nature of warfare has undergone significant change during the last century. The successful "short war" strategies of the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian conflicts have given way to the prolonged combat of World Wars I and II. The metamorphosis of warfare has resulted in the strategy of surprise and annihilation degenerating into conflict of attrition. The reasons for these changes are many. The early success of a "short war" strategy resulted, in part, from the fact that those conflicts were generally initiated with specific and limited national objectives. The motivation for war was political rather than economic or ideological. At the outset, those hostilities were entered into with a definite plan for war termination.

The value of history is to learn from it--not merely to emulate it. The changing interrelationships of the elements of war, technological improvements in firepower and delivery, and global economic/industrial interdependence of nations are but a few of the reasons that the 19th Century successes of the Prussians cannot serve as the basis for contemporary strategic planning.

As the United States and its allies develop the strategic plans which are to carry them into the 21st Century, the object lessons learned from both World Wars cannot be ignored. Those who formulated the theory and doctrine for those wars not only overlooked the possibility of a long conflict, but

had, as Earl Ziemke suggested, "seemingly gone out of their way to ignore it". In many respects one can draw many parallels between circumstances, attitudes and issues of today and those which existed prior to 1914 and 1939. Statements relative to the desirability of a "short war" strategy rather than one of "long war" can be made with certainty. A Short War is affordable. Preparations can be made for conflict of short duration without the devastating economic impact required to provide for long-term sustainability. Investment in war stockage can be minimized; industrial production can continue with a focus on consumption rather than military items; conscription may not be required; and no real tradeoff between social and defense programs is required. National Will is easier to mobilize and sustain over the shorthaul and the question of alliances may not be relevant if the conflict is sufficiently short.

However, the strategy of Short War and the failure to mobilize industry and the economy have proven disasterous twice in this century. Initial successes have been no guarantee of ultimate victory. The lesson of history clearly suggests that strategic planning must consider the probability of prolonged conventional conflict. By planning for the longhaul many of the Short War concerns can be simultaneously accomodated.

Previous Administration policies have caused defense planners and commanders in the field to prepare for and resign themselves to a short (15-30 day) conventional war, based on 7-10 days of warning. This Short War could most probably revert to use of nuclear weapons where Central Europe is concerned. Using this worse case, our conventional force structure is

dependent on enhanced mobility and lift given the currently inadequate War Reserve Stocks in Theater. The European allies, in dire economic straits, find themselves unable to substantially increase their force structure. Through the 1980's the United States must also plan for the deployment of forces to Southwest Asia or the Far East (using the same inadequate 'lift' and 'bottoms') where reserve stocks are even more limited than Europe. This 1980's Strategy exacerbates the previously accepted worse case in Europe and causes Soviet planners to consider a potential Two Front conventional conflict, or a phased, protracted conflict of indeterminate duration. All the more reason for the United States to take advantage of peacetime and upgrade the Production Base capability so as to shorten the unacceptable gap between our D-Day sustainment levels and arrival of requisite materials from the production base in CONUS.

In order to do this the Services must adopt a program whereby their specific requirements for materiel are based on jointly agreed upon analysis. The national policies and related strategies essentially obviate the need for rhetoric. However, there are distinct biases, especially with the Air Force and Navy. These two services form the essence of our Strategic Forces. The deterrent quality of our conventional force cannot (in many cases) compare with that of the Strategic Force. This was especially true from 1960-1975. Policies have changed and the USSR must now begin to understand our national determination to deploy conventional forces while we build a capability to enhance deployment and sustainment of those forces. They may not put much value on our allies, but they cannot discount our growing determination to deter conflict by conventional means while ensuring political survival with nuclear weapons.

Historically treated separately, both orientations now depend on a revitalized economy; an enhanced Industrial Base and a clear statement of requirements vigorously monitored (and where necessary enforced by) the Administration and Congress. Admittedly this will require a reeducation of Congress and a reorientation of that body from the current emphasis they place on the Planning, Programming and Budget System. It will also require that DOD change its way of doing business so that all of the Services participate in preparing to win the next war in accordance with the same ground rules. Since publication of the 1983 Defense Guidance things are beginning to change, but there is a need to build-in a capability to plan for and program our specific needs so that sustainment and modernization become coequals in a policy of deterrence. Based on the anticipated success of the current Defense Guidance it will take at least until 1988 to remedy the circumstances that force the Short War option in Central Europe. Based on the strong potential early use of Theater Nuclear Weapons it is imperative that the 1988 goal of enhanced sustainability and preparedness be realized.

Several fallacies exist in the short war vs. long war debate as it is currently structured. The first of these is equating the amount of warning time with the length of conflict duration. Short warning does not a priori lead to a short war nor long warning to a long war. The second fallacy is that any conventional war which appears to be developing into a protracted war would automatically escalate into a general nuclear war. The third fallacy is the line of reasoning which holds that any future conflict involving the US/USSR will be short because the Arab-Israeli wars were short. The fourth fallacy is the one which holds that industrial mobilization is irrelevant in a

short war. The utility of industrial mobilization is more a function of warning time, and industrial mobilization would be necessary even if only to rearm following a short conventional war.

In assessing this debate the key issues are the amount of warning and the role and impact of mobilization. Based on history we should have several months to several years of increasing political and military warning, even if the actual attack does achieve some degree of surprise. Thus it is necessary for the United States to plan for mobilization and the possibility of a long war.

Mobilization, and industrial mobilization in particular, is a continuum composed of incremental and sometimes overlapping steps. Many mobilization steps can be taken in response to and during the relatively long period of ambiguous warning which we can expect. Thus it is the U.S. that should develop the plans for an incremental turning on of the industrial base during periods of increasing tension.

In planning, the United States must be prepared for a wide variety of likely scenarios. The U.S. cannot afford to base all of its planning and force structure on one scenario, no matter how likely, because of the risks involved. A spectral approach is necessary to balance the requirements for readiness, sustainability, and force modernization against the range of possible scenarios. By emphasizing the incremental return on investment relative to the current defense posture, a greater overall increase in force effectiveness is achievable.

Conclusions

The Annual Reports to the Congress by the Secretary of Defense for Fiscal Year 1983 and 1984 set the tone for the kind of war we will prepare to fight and they identify what has been wrong with our past policies. Explicit in the FY 83 report is an official renouncement of the Short War philosophy. Implicit in the FY 84 report is a commitment to offset the deficiencies which brought about the Short War theory. The point to make here is that we have not been preparing for a Short War--We have been constrained from fighting any other kind of war because of inadequate C3I, War Reserve Stocks and Industrial Base Preparedness. The FY 84 Defense Budget sets forth some specific remedies to these historic constraints. Although these improvements emphasize the management arena there are some specific commitments of monies to improve a weak Sustaining Base and weak levels of War Reserve Stocks. However, there is a distinct need for increased cooperation by the Armed Forces to identify their specific needs of the industrial base. There is a need to improve the debilitated Army Individual Ready Reserve. A joint review of the National Stockpile by Defense, Commerce and Industry is required in order to identify specific improvement and refinements relative to raw materials, levels of stockage required, and estimated life span of necessary raw materials. From this review, export/import requirements can be reassessed. Nuclear Arms Limitation Talks must be instilled with a positive approach, while we withhold early U.S. commitment in order to regain an edge over the Soviets. Given the fact that weapons and material currently in the Research and Development stage will be those equipments fielded to replace existing inventories over the next

fifteen years, modifications to our Strategy and Doctrine (such as Air Land Battle 2000) must be made so that optimal use is made of that equipment if it is to be fielded at the beginning of, or during conflict. Fielding of additional, critically needed ships and planes for mobility must be prioritized ahead of longer range programs.

Although we are beginning to convince the Soviets and their proxies of our National Determination to improve our defense posture we are not yet ready to convince the American people. Whereas the Soviets are impressed with our increasing readiness and force modernization, the American people are presently only concerned with the capability of Government to turn the economy favorably. In many respects there is a growing isolationism which stems from a "me first" attitude.

Continuing harangues by the Administration as to the Threat posed by the USSR and comparisons of imbalance do not appeal to the man on the street and will not offset a basic selfishness. The American people prefer and need to be reminded of their strength and they are more responsive to appeals by Government when they are convinced of advantage, not disadvantage. They do not believe that the Administration is serious and any discussions of Mutual Assured Destruction turns the people off. Given the current trend of the economy it may be 1984 before the American people are ready to discuss and respond to calls for sacrifice and determination on an international scale. Not until then will we have a stable and credible deterrence that will give the Soviets cause to stop and think. We are in a race for time. The Soviets are attempting to solidify their sphere of influence while correcting their

own internal problems. The American people will neither be intimidated by their own government, nor will they accept the inevitability of Soviet designs. It is this characteristic which still gives the Soviets concern relative to our potential use of nuclear weapons. They are not sure if the American people would support strategic use of those weapons if they thought we would lose everything without their use. Our allies, on the other hand, are not convinced that we will use nuclear weapons to defend them at the outset of war, but they are neither willing to, nor economically capable of increasing their conventional deterrence. It is much easier for our allies to support our needs for prepositioned sites for war reserve stocks, while at the same time attempting to stabilize their own economies. The onus for changing from a Short War concept to a credible ability to wage protracted conventional conflict is on the United States.

The most significant thing that could disrupt a viable timetable is involvement in a limited conflict with a nonaligned country. It is to the Soviet advantage however that the United States not be allowed to use that conflict as an excuse, as we did during the Korean War, to accelerate our industrial base and sustaining base capacities. The Soviets cannot afford to allow us any excuse to accelerate those capacities.

The resurgence of emphasis on the industrial and sustaining bases has begun. Based on the DOD Budget, it will take until 1988 to make those bases healthy again. If the economy improves in the 1984 timeframe we can begin to convince the American people of their intrinsic strength and that may allow us to put new blood into the industrial side and make the production base well.

Increased investment could improve real growth of the GNP, and decrease unemployment. For the first time in 20 years there is a potential for efficient long-range planning which combines national goals, objectives, policies and strategy. It could result in a very favorable situation. More importantly, from a Defense viewpoint, it could put to bed any need to discuss the constraints of military power as a prime ingredient of strategy, as has been the case with the Short War/Long War debate. In the meantime we must improve the way we do business in the budget business so that the deterrent quality of preparedness is not solely related to the troops and equipment in the field. We must prepare for the day we hope never comes, but we must also present a credible determination to prevail if deterrence fails. The race against time is barely in our favor. We must get smart and take advantage of this everyway we can.

Recommendations:

- The Armed Forces support current SECDEF initiatives by action as well as spirit.
- DOD submit military requirements in specific terms of tons of steel, titanium, etc. as the basis for industrial planning.
- The Service Chiefs identify their specific needs for sustainment by the industrial base and fund the related programs.
- Improve the Army Individual Ready Reserve.
- Department of Defense develop the force structure necessary to support our military requirements without regard to arbitrary or predetermined budget ceilings and procure that force at the lowest possible cost.

-Hold Congressional hearings relative to the national planning for industrial mobilization.

-Department of Defense, Department of Commerce and Industry jointly review the specific improvements to the National Stockpile.

-Withhold early U.S. commitment to the Nuclear Arms Limitation Talks long enough for the United States to gain a deterrent edge, not solely in the nuclear deterrent context.

-Adjust strategy and doctrine so that optimal use is made of equipment currently in R&D and projected for fielding in 1990.

-Develop a strategy for incremental industrial mobilization in response to ambiguous warning.

-Prioritize funding for sea and air mobility assets and C3I ahead of longer range technology programs.

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